




   
  
Article 6 and the Global Stocktake












The positions expressed in this paper are strictly those of the authors and represent neither the 
opinion of the Wuppertal Institute nor of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety. 
The Wuppertal Institute is carrying out the “JIKO”-project on behalf of the German 







Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy 
Döppersberg 19 • 42103 Wuppertal • Germany 
www.wupperinst.org 
This work is published under Creative Commons Attribution – 
NonCommercial –NoDerivatives 4.0 International license | 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
October 2018 
Cover Photo:  2017 technical expert meeting on adaptation  by UN Climate Change / Flickr / 







     
Article 6 and 
the Global Stocktake 
Lukas Hermwi l le and Nicolas Kreib ich
  
 
Article 6 and the Global Stocktake 
Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... II  
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3  





The Global Stocktake – Article 14 Voluntary Cooperation – Article 6 Interdependencies between Artic................................................................................................................... 4
 .................................................................................................................. 7
  
les 6 and 14............................................................................................. 8  
3 The Global Stocktake: Key Functions........................................................................ 10
 






 Enhancing Ambition ...... Guidance and Signal ...................................................................................................................................... 11
 ................................................................................................................................ 12
  
................................................................................................................................ 13  
4 Conclusions and Recommendations......................................................................... 15















Lukas Hermwille & Nicolas Kreibich 
Abstract  
The Global Stocktake and Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement are both supposed to support the 
raising of ambition of global climate action. Yet,
thus far the two elements of the Paris Agree­
ment have been discussed mostly in relative 
isolation from each other. This Policy Paper 
aims to change this.  
The paper first examines the relationship be­
tween the Global Stocktake (Art. 14) and Article 
6 by analysing cross-references from the two 
Articles to other elements of the Paris Agree­
ment and vice-versa. We find that there is no 
explicit direct linkage between the Global
Stocktake and Article 6. There is however a 
strong indirect connection through the NDCs 
and the Enhanced Transparency Framework. 
The Global Stocktake is supposed to inform 
subsequent NDCs whereas Article 6 enables 
voluntary cooperation among Parties to raise 
the ambition in implementing climate action.
The Transparency Framework is supposed to 
inform the “assessment of collective progress” 
under the Global Stocktake. Yet, this assess­
ment can only be transparent, complete and 
consistent, if it duly considers any international
transfers of emission reductions generated in
accordance with Article 6.  
The Paper furthermore introduces four func­
tions of the Global Stocktake – a pacemaker,
ensurer of accountability, enhancer of ambition 
and provider of guidance and signal – and dis­
cusses how Article 6 and corresponding coop­
erative activities could support (or undermine) 
these functions.
The Paper concludes by recommending that a 
strong exchange process between the Global
Stocktake and Article 6 be established. This 
would not only be of utmost importance to al­
low for the Global Stocktake to properly per-
form its functions (in particular its accountabil­
ity function), but could also assist the 
development of Article 6 activities. Furthermore 
we recommend that the Global Stocktake cre­
ates an opportunity to periodically review 
Arti­cle 6 and its governance frameworks. Such 
a re­view process could, for example, be 
modelled after the CDM Policy Dialogue of 
2012, in which independent research on past 
CDM activities was conducted to elaborate 
reform proposals for the mechanism. 
At this stage, it is impossible to draw final con­
clusions on the relationship between Article 6 
and the Global Stocktake not least because 
there is still a high degree of uncertainty about 
the design of both elements. Yet, there is an 
important conversation to be had and this Poli­
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1 Introduction  
The Paris Agreement has established an open­
ended framework for climate action with the 5­
yearly cycle of nationally determined contribu­
tions (NDCs) at its core. Yet, the first round of 
(intended) NDCs falls far short of what is need­
ed to comply with the Paris Agreements’ “well­
below 2°C”-goal. The Parties themselves noted 
“with concern that the estimated aggregate 
greenhouse gas emission levels in 2025 and 
2030 resulting from the intended nationally de­
termined contributions do not fall within least­
cost 2°C scenarios [and] that much greater 
emission reduction efforts will be required than
those associated with the intended nationally
determined contributions in order to hold the 
increase in the global average temperature to 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC 
2016b, para. 17, also see 2016c).
This was not unforeseen. Parties expected that 
initial ambition would not be sufficient and 
hence established a process that facilitates the 
raising of ambition. The Global Stocktake is a 
key component of what has been called the 
“ambition mechanism” (Müller and Ngwadla
2016). The Global Stocktake is one of the peri­
odic elements of the Paris Agreement. It is sup­
posed to “assess collective progress” of the Par­
ties towards the goals of the Agreement in 
order to inform subsequent NDCs (UNFCCC 
2016a, Art. 14).
Although it is not part of what has been called 
the “ambition mechanism” or “ratchet mecha­
nism”, Article 6 of the Paris Agreement also has 
an explicit requirement to promote ambition 
(Kreibich 2018, Howard 2018, Warnecke et al.
2018). Article 6 specifically highlights that 
“some Parties choose to pursue voluntary co­
operation in the implementation of their na­
tionally determined contributions to allow for 
higher ambition in their mitigation and adapta­
tion actions” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 6.1, emphasis 
added).
Despite the common purpose, the two ele­
ments have to date been discussed mostly in
isolation, both in the negotiations as well as in
the wider literature. 
This Policy Paper sets out to change this. The 
paper will explore the relationship between Ar­
ticle 6 and the Global Stocktake. Section 2 pro­
vides an analysis of the Global Stocktake in the 
wider legal architecture of the Paris Agreement. 
While there are no explicit relationships be­
tween Article 14 (Global Stocktake) and Article 
6, there are numerous ways in which the two 
articles are indirectly linked. 
Section 3 then introduces four functions of the 
Global Stocktake: a pacemaker, ensurer of ac­
countability, enhancer of ambition and provid­
er of guidance and signal. For each of these 
functions we discuss whether and how Article 6 
relates to them and whether it could contribute 
to supporting them. Finally, section 4 concludes 
and recommends that Article 6 should be duly 
considered in the Global Stocktake. Further­
more we recommend that the Global Stocktake 
creates an opportunity to periodically review 
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2 The Global Stocktake and  
Article 6 in Context
2.1 The Global Stocktake – 
Article 14 
This section discusses the Global Stocktake 
(UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 14) within the legal con­
text by highlighting cross-references between 
the Global Stocktake and other elements of the 
Paris Agreement. We will first look at how Arti­
cle 14 refers to other sections of the Paris 
Agreement. In a second step we then explore 
how the Global Stocktake is referred to in other 
paragraphs of the agreement.
Art. 14.1  The Conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall 
periodically take stock of the implementation of 
this Agreement to assess the collective progress 
towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement 
and its long-term goals (referred to as the “Global
Stocktake”). It shall do so in a comprehensive and 
facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adap­
tation and the means of implementation and 
support, and in the light of equity and the best 
available science. (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 14)
Art. 14.1 provides the mandate for the Global
Stocktake. Although there are no explicit link­
ages to other elements of the Paris Agreement, 
there are clear implicit connections. First, Art.
14.1 refers to the “purpose of this Agreement 
and its long-term goals”. This clearly refers to 
the three specific objectives outlined in Art. 2 of 
the Paris Agreement:  
• Mitigation target (Art. 2.1a): to limit global
warming to well below 2°C and to make ef­
forts to limit global warming to 1.5°C above
pre-industrial levels.
• Adaptation target (Art. 2.1b): to increase
the capacity for climate change adaptation
and to promote climate resilience and low-
GHG development.
• Finance target (Art. 2.1c): to make (global)
financial flows consistent with the other
two objectives.
The last sentence of Art. 14.1 also refers to nu­
merous other elements of the Paris Agreement.
The Paris Agreement has dedicated Articles for 
mitigation (Art. 4), adaptation (Art. 7), and 
means of implementation and support (Art. 9 
on finance, Art. 10 on technological support,
and Art. 11 on capacity building). Finally, the 
term “equity” can only be interpreted to refer to 
Art. 2.2 of the Paris Agreement. It states that the 
“Agreement will be implemented to reflect eq­
uity and the principle of common but differen­
tiated responsibilities and respective capabili­
ties, in the light of different national circum­
stances” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 2.2). The principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities 
(CBDR) was already established in Art. 3.1 of the 
original United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (United Nations 1992).
While Art. 14.2 specifies the time line and insti­
tutional setup for the Global Stocktake – every 5 
years as of 2023 and under the auspices of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meet­
ing of the Parties to this Agreement (CMA) – Art.
14.3 again contains a number of references to 
other elements.  
Art. 14.3 The outcome of the Global Stocktake 
shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in
a nationally determined manner, their actions 





















visions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing 
international cooperation for climate action.
(UNFCCC 2016a)
The first part of the Article clearly refers to the 
NDCs established in Art. 3 of the Paris Agree­
ment as a vehicle for promulgating national
mitigation and adaptation policies and 
measures. It further refers again to action (i.e. 
Mitigation action, Art. 4, and Adaptation action,
Art. 7) and support (Art. 9-11). Not explicitly
mentioned but perhaps still relevant are the 
long-term low greenhouse gas emission devel­
opment strategies (LEDS) that parties have 
been “invited” to prepare as per Art. 4.19. The 
Global Stocktake provides an opportunity to 
highlight the (dis-)connection between NDCs,
these long-term mitigation strategies, and the 
temperature goals. 
The last sub clause is a bit peculiar. The refer­
ence to “international cooperation for climate 
action” was introduced by China in the very last 
iteration of the negotiation text in Paris.1 It is 
unclear what the basis for inclusion was (Frie­
drich 2017). Within the Paris Agreement the 
term “international cooperation” is only used at 
this very occasion and not elsewhere. However, 
it resembles to some extent the provisions of 
Art. 6 that specifies that countries may voluntar­
ily cooperate in implementing their NDCs (Art. 
6.1) by means of “cooperative approaches” (Art. 
6.2). Thus, a narrow implementation would be,
that the last bit of Art. 14.3 refers to any type of 
cooperation pursuant to Art. 6. This interpreta­
tion is not entirely implausible as also Art. 6 was 
completed at the last minute in Paris (Obergas­
sel et al. 2015, 2016) and hence coincides with 
the late insertion of the respective sub clause in 
Art. 14.3.  
However, a more widely shared interpretation is 
that the section refers much wider to all kinds 
1 Personal communication with a member of the French 
Presidency of COP21. 
Article 6 and the Global Stocktake 
of international cooperation beyond the UN­
FCCC (cf. Friedrich 2017). This would relate for 
example to the International Civil Aviation Or­
ganisation (ICAO) and International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO), but could also extend to,
for example, the World Trade Organisation.
Given the acknowledged role of non-state and 
subnational actors and the increasing number 
of transnational governance initiatives, it is also 
reasonably plausible that the authors of the sub 
clause intended the Global Stocktake as a 
means to orchestrate the wider inter- and 
transnational climate governance landscape 
(Milkoreit and Haapala 2017).
There are also a number of passages in the Paris 
Agreement that refer to Art. 14 implicitly or ex­
plicitly. These include:  
• Art. 4.9 which mandates Parties to com­
municate and/or update NDCs every 5 years
that shall be informed by the Global Stock­
take.
• Art. 7.14 makes specific provisions for how
adaptation shall be considered within the
Global Stocktake.
• Likewise, Art. 9.6 spells out how climate fi­
nance shall be reflected in the Global Stock­
take.
• Art. 10.6 outlines how the Global Stocktake
shall account for technology support and
technology transfer.
• Art. 13.5 and 13.6 are particularly important
as they state that the purpose of the trans­
parency framework is to inform the Global
Stocktake about implementation of action
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Figure 1: References from the Global Stocktake (Article 14) to other elements of the Paris Agreement (upper figure) and
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Article 6 and the Global Stocktake 
2.2 Voluntary Cooperation – 
Article 6  
In a similar way, Article 6 relates to various oth­
er elements of the Paris Agreement. Art. 6.1 en­
ables Parties to voluntarily cooperate in the 
“implementation of their nationally determined 
contributions to allow for higher ambition in
their mitigation and adaptation actions and to 
promote sustainable development and envi­
ronmental integrity” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 6.1).
This explicitly refers to Articles 3 (NDCs in gen­
eral), 4 (mitigation) and 7 (adaptation). The ref­
erence to sustainable development can be re­
lated to the preamble of the Paris Agreement 
that highlights “the intrinsic relationship that
climate change actions, responses and impacts 
have with equitable access to sustainable de­
velopment and eradication of poverty” and also 
Art. 2 which situates the long-term goals of the 
Paris Agreement “in the context of sustainable 
development” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 2.1).
Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.5 respectively refer to the 
attainment of NDCs. Art. 6.2 introduces the 
concept of internationally transferred mitiga­
tion outcomes (ITMOs) that can be used by the 
purchasing country towards its NDC. Indirectly,
those paragraphs also refer to Enhanced Trans­
parency Framework (Art. 13) of the Paris 
Agreement. Art. 6.2 refers to “robust account­
ing” and the “avoidance of double counting”.
Art. 6.5 specifies that emission reductions from 
the “mechanism to contribute to the mitigation 
of greenhouse gas emissions and support sus­
tainable development” established in Art. 6.4 
must not be used to demonstrate the achieve­
ment of the host countries NDC if it is also used 
by another country to do so.
Finally, Art. 6.8 specifies “non-market ap­
proaches” to support the implementation of 
NDCs specifically referring to mitigation, adap­
tation, finance, technology transfer and capaci-
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ty-building.
It is striking, though, that there are no instances 
of other elements of the Paris Agreement refer­
ring explicitly to Article 6. This may be due to 
the fact that it was unclear until the very end 
whether or not the Paris Agreement would in­
clude any reference to what is now called “co­
operative approaches”. However, it also mirrors 
the fact that the prospects of market-based co­
operative climate action within the negotia­
tions has been discussed within a rather close 
network and in parallel rather then in interde­
pendence with the more overarching agenda 
items.  
2.3 Interdependencies between 
Articles 6 and 14 
The Global Stocktake has a mandate to take 
stock of the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement “in a comprehensive [...] manner” 
(UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 14.1). Based on this formu­
lation, the scope of the Global Stocktake covers 
all the main elements of the Paris Agreement.
Arguably, this also includes Article 6. As Frie­
drich put it: “The emphasis on the comprehen­
sive nature of the global stocktake means that 
in case there is doubt over whether something 
should be included in the global stocktake,
there is a presumption in favour of inclusion.“ 
(Friedrich 2017, 328).
Still, the above analysis demonstrates that there
is no explicit and direct link between Article 6 
and the Global Stocktake. The two Articles are,
however, linked indirectly through two key el­
ements of the Paris Agreement: the NDCs and 
the Enhanced Transparency Framework. 
The Global Stocktake is supposed to assess col­
lective progress (i.e. assess the collective ambi­
tion of current NDCs as well as the progress to­
wards implementing them) and its purpose is
to inform the next iteration of NDCs. Given the 
shortfall of ambition in the first round of NDCs,
this “informing” must be as indicating what a 
sufficient level of ambition or even the “highest 
possible ambition” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 4.3) en­
tails. 
Likewise, the purpose of cooperative approach­
es under Art. 6 is to enable Parties to raise miti­
gation and adaptation ambition. Unfortunately,
it is much less clear how and when this raising
of ambition should be achieved (for a 
discussion of how Art. 6 could contribute to 
raising ambition see Kreibich 2018; Howard 
2018; Warnecke et al. 2018). Should Art. 6 con­
tribute to raise ambition in the current NDC pe­
riod? Should international cooperation moti­
vate Parties to take on more ambitious NDCs in 
the next iteration of the NDC cycle? 
The link between the two elements is even 
closer through the Enhanced Transparency 
Framework (Art. 13). The purpose of the Trans­
parency Framework is to inform the Global 
Stocktake. Of course, this can only be achieved 
if the Transparency Framework takes full ac­
count of the cooperative activities Parties en­
gage with under Art. 6.
GHG reporting needs to be transparent, accu­
rate, complete, consistent, and comparable 
(TACCC principles, see IPCC 2006). The Paris 
Agreement explicitly refers to this standard by 
requiring Parties to “promote environmental 
integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, 
comparability and consistency, and ensure the 
avoidance of double counting, in accordance 
with guidance adopted by the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Agreement” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 14.3) in
accounting for emissions and removals corre­
sponding to their NDCs. Whenever Parties 
choose to cooperate on the basis of Art. 6 and a 
country uses emission reductions generated in
another country to demonstrate the achieve­
ment of its own NDC, GHG reporting can only 
be considered transparent, complete and con­
sistent if those emission reductions and the cor­
responding adjustments (also see UNFCCC 
8 
 
Article 6 and the Global Stocktake 
2016b, para. 36) in the host countries GHG re­
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3 The Global Stocktake:  
Key Functions
As stated in the introduction, the Global Stock­
take has received a lot of attention, because it is 
supposed to play a leading role in catalysing 
climate action in subsequent NDC periods. This
section outlines four functions by and through 
which the Global Stocktake could ideally con­
tribute to a maximization of ambition as re­
quired per Art. 4.3 of the Paris Agreement.2 For 
each of these functions it discusses whether 
and how Article 6 and any activities carried out 
in accordance with it can and should contribute 
to the Global Stocktake and/or be scrutinized 
under it.
3.1 Pacemaker Function 
The Paris Agreement contains relatively few 
mandatory legal requirements on nation states 
in terms of “obligations of results”. There are,
however, a range of “obligations of conduct” 
(Oberthür and Bodle 2016). The procedural
rules of the Paris Agreement – the 5-yearly cycle 
of NDC updates, assessment and review of na­
tional action and support, as well as the aggre­
gate assessment of implementation in the form
of periodical Global Stocktakes – create a 
“pacemaker” that helps to stimulate and syn­
chronize climate policy processes (Obergassel
et al. 2016). Essentially, the NDC cycle resem­
bles a prototypical policy cycle (see Figure 3)
2 The analysis of the four functions of the Global Stocktake 
is based on ongoing research on behalf of the German 
Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt) un­
der grant FKZ 3717181030. A first discussion paper on an 
ideal Global Stocktake has been published (Hermwille 
and Siemons 2018). 
(Jann et al. 2007). But what is the specific role of 
the Global Stocktake within this policy cycle? 
The Global Stocktake reinforces the periodic 5­
yearly rhythm of the Paris Agreement: it bridges
the evaluation stage and the agenda setting 
stage for subsequent NDC cycles. It aggregates 
the individual country-level evaluations in order 
to formulate conclusions at the global level.
These conclusions will inform the respective na­
tional climate policy agendas for the next round 
of NDCs.
What is required to enable the Global Stocktake 
to effectively function as an agenda setting 
mechanism? First and foremost, the Global 
Stocktake can only effectively aggregate and 
conclude on the individual country evaluations 
if they are available as an input in time.
Secondly, to have a significant effect on nation­
al policy processes, the outputs should be for­
mulated in a way that resonates with the na­
tional discourse of as many countries as 
possible. General statements and mere calls for 
urgency will most likely not have a strong im­
pact. It may be necessary to differentiate and 
formulate specific challenges that, for example, 
correspond to different stages of economic de­
velopment. For that purpose, data and analyses 
need to be supplied that enable formulation of 
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Figure 3: The NDC Cycle as a policy cycle. Source: Wuppertal Institute.
So how does this function relate to Article 6? 
Perhaps, there are relatively few interlinkages 
with Article 6 and the pacemaker function of 
the Global Stocktake. In order to fulfil this func­
tion, the requirements for the Global Stocktake 
are primarily of procedural nature. At this point, 
we do not see any synergies or trade-offs with 
Article 6.
3.2 Ensuring Accountability 
From a rationalist perspective, one of the key 
criticisms of the Paris Agreement is its lack of
legal compulsion. To some extent, this has been 
substituted by a focus on transparency in the 
hope that a threat of ‘naming and shaming’ can 
discipline policy makers to adequately imple­
ment their NDCs (Obergassel et al. 2015, 2016;
Oberthür and Bodle 2016; Bodansky 2016). But 
what is required in order to make naming and 
shaming effective and what can the Global 
Stocktake contribute to this? 
For the ‘naming’ part a key requirement is 
transparency. Without accurate and sufficiently 
granular data it remains impossible to deter­
mine whether or not, and to what extent, coun­
tries have attained their NDCs. For the ‘sham­
ing’ part, a critical level of public attention is
required. The transparency framework will most
likely not be sufficient in this regard. This is 
where the Global Stocktake could make a con­
tribution. By publicly receiving, reviewing and 
appraising individual country reports, the Glob­
al Stocktake could create an echo chamber for 
the transparency framework that helps to at­
tract the necessary public attention. 
However, the Global Stocktake has a very nar­
row mandate (if at all) in this regard: Art. 14.1 
postulates that the Global Stocktake is sup­
posed to assess collective progress only. Hence,
Milkoreit and Haapala (2017) argue that there is
no scope for ‘naming and shaming’ within the 
Global Stocktake. This seems correct in the 
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al Stocktake need to summarise individual 
country data in order to draw global conclu­
sions. The Global Stocktake is not supposed to 
compare country performance, but, ideally, it
would still support comparability.  
When it comes to naming and shaming, Article 
6 is of particular importance. The emphasis on 
environmental integrity and the avoidance of 
double counting already give an indication. If
accounting of international transfer of emission 
reductions under Article 6 is incomplete or in­
transparent this could severely impede the ac­
countability function of the Global Stocktake. In 
the absence of a robust Art. 6 accounting sys­
tem, there is a risk that countries could build 
“low-ambition coalitions” and use Article 6 to 
mask their failure to comply with the Paris 
Agreement (see also Kreibich and Hermwille 
2016; Hermwille and Obergassel 2018).  
3.3 Enhancing Ambition 
As outlined in the introduction, the current lev­
el of ambition still falls short of what is neces­
sary (UNFCCC 2016c). To make up for this, Par­
ties’ next round of NDCs will at least have to 
comply with Art. 4.3 of the Paris Agreement in
that they ‘will represent a progression beyond 
the Party’s then current nationally determined 
contribution and reflect its highest possible 
ambition’ (UNFCCC 2016b, Art. 4.3).
There are two ways in which the Global Stock­
take could support this provision, combining 
aspects of the aforementioned rationalist and 
technology-optimist perspectives.3 
Firstly, the Global Stocktake could determine 
benchmarks that may help to operationalize  
3 In order to avoid confusion. This section discusses how 
the Global Stocktake can contribute to raising ambition 
and how Article & can support this. The ambition raising 
requirement expressed in Art. 6.1 is not considered here 
(see e.g. Kreibich 2018, Howard 2018, Warnecke et al. 
2018). 
what is meant by ‘highest possible ambition’
and what constitutes a progression beyond the 
current NDC. One benchmark would be to de­
termine what kind of level of ambition is re­
quired in the upcoming NDC period, taking into 
account the achievements and shortfalls of the 
current NDC period. Another useful benchmark 
would be to identify and showcase particularly 
ambitious NDCs or aspects of NDCs. This would 
help to raise the bar of what is commonly per­
ceived as ‘the highest level of ambition’. Cover­
ing a diverse portfolio of countries with differ­
ent states of development and a wide range of 
specific national circumstances would help to 
account for the latter part of Art. 4.3:  the refer­
ence to equity and national circumstances.
This kind of benchmark leads us to the second 
important contribution the Global Stocktake 
could make in order to enhance the ambition of 
NDCs. Milkoreit and Haapala (2017, 2) have 
proposed to ‘use the Global Stocktake as a 
peer-learning platform for “how to do trans­
formational change”’. This could be achieved if
the Global Stocktake were to identify synergies 
and transformative potentials to facilitate sus­
tainable development in broader terms than 
just focussing on mitigation potentials. Parties 
may be motivated much more by positive de­
velopment potentials and synergetic opportu­
nities than by yet another call for urgency.
Both of these aspects of enhancing ambition 
may link to Article 6, but in different ways. The 
setting of benchmarks for subsequent NDCs 
could be a valuable resource for any activities 
under Article 6. One key challenge of market­
based mitigation action in the past was the de­
termination of “additionality”. Under the CDM,
for example, proposed activities had to demon­
strate that they would not be viable without the 
support of the mechanism. This provision was 
considered a safeguard of environmental integ­
rity since it avoided that activities would be 
supported and credited that would have oc­
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emission reductions. If such flawed credits 
would be used to offset emissions elsewhere, 
the overall emissions would rise. Now it has 
been argued that the concept of additionality 
remains fundamental for any market-based mit­
igation activities under Article 6, particularly if
the resulting emission reductions are counted 
towards the NDC of a different country than the 
host country of the mitigation activity 
(Hermwille and Obergassel 2018; Michaelowa 
and Butzengeiger 2017; Schneider and La Hoz 
Theuer 2018).
A key challenge, however, is to determine what 
should be the baseline against which to assess 
additionality. Additional to what should a pro­
posed activity be? Since all countries are now 
obligated to develop and implement progres­
sively more ambitious NDCs, business as usual
must no longer serve as such a baseline. The 
NDCs themselves may be considered, but as 
Hermwille and Obergassel (2018) argue, there 
are significant challenges with NDCs them­
selves including the fact that many NDCs are 
simply incompatible with the long-term goals 
of the Paris Agreement. Any global and/or re­
gional benchmarks developed for and political­
ly vetted through the Global Stocktake could 
become however, a valuable resource for Art. 6 
activities as a baseline for additionality demon­
stration. Proposed activities could base their 
additionality demonstration on these bench­
marks and argue, if implemented, how they 
would go beyond this benchmark.
The second aspect relates to the concept of
transformational learning outlined above. Mar­
ket-based mechanisms have proved to be par­
ticularly effective in identifying and realizing
low-cost mitigation potentials (Shishlov and 
Bellassen 2012; Healy 2017). Making emission 
reductions a valuable resource has sparked the 
creativity and innovative capacity of private ac­
tors. If Article 6 (and in particular Art. 6.4 which 
has an explicit mandate to include private ac­
tors) are fully implemented, it is very likely that 
such innovative forces will continue. It can rea­
sonably be expected that this engagement will 
lead to innovative projects, programmes and 
other activities that could provide good prac­
tice examples that could be highlighted in a fa­
cilitative format under the Global Stocktake. 
3.4 Guidance and Signal 
The international relations literature increasing­
ly recognizes that many international institu­
tions, including the Paris Agreement, assume a 
guidance and signal function that extends be­
yond the international level (Falkner 2016; Bo­
dansky 2017; Hermwille et al. 2017; Morseletto, 
Biermann, and Pattberg 2016; Young 2017). In 
the words of Oberthür et al. the adoption of 
strong collective goals and pathways to achieve 
those goals “signals the resolve of governments 
(or other members of international institutions) 
to pursue a certain course of action and hence 
indicates likely policy trajectories to business, 
investors and other actors operating at all levels 
of governance. As such, the signal and direction 
provided has the potential to help synchronise 
and align developments across levels of gov­
ernance and across the boundaries of different 
countries” (Oberthür et al. 2017, 16).
The guidance and signal function of the Paris 
Agreement mainly derives from the purpose of 
the Paris Agreement (Art. 2) and in particular 
the long-term temperature goal (Art. 2.1a). This 
temperature goal is further operationalized by 
the goal to achieve climate neutrality in the se­
cond half of the century (Art. 4.1). Together they 
provide a top-level, collectively agreed vision 
for the global transformation (Hermwille 2016; 
UNFCCC 2016a).
Yet, for some sectors of the economy the signal
provided seems much clearer than for others. 
For many sectors, a great deal of ambiguity re­
mains of what the 1.5°C goal actually means.
While the challenges are relatively clear for the 
13 
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power sector and the electrification of passen­
ger transport, they remain relatively vague for 
example on emission intensive industries, agri­
culture and land-use including forestry (cf. Ku­
ramochi et al. 2018).
In the light of this discussion, what is the role of 
the Global Stocktake? First of all, the Global 
Stocktake is an opportunity to reiterate and re­
inforce the signal already provided in Paris.
More importantly, though, the Global Stocktake 
could further develop and refine the existing 
signal. Refining the signal provided from the 
Paris Agreement would not only help guide the 
next round of NDCs, but could also serve as an 
updated reference point for all kinds of govern­
ance initiatives (incl. non-state and subnational
actors). 
Much like in the pacemaker function, there are 
no direct synergies between Article 6 and the 
guidance and signal function of the Global
Stocktake. The Global Stocktake and activities 
under Article 6, however, do possess some
complementarities. Article 6 is seen by many as 
a potential avenue to cooperate more closely 
and eventually coordinate the various carbon 
pricing initiatives that have been mushrooming 
around the globe (World Bank 2017). Carbon 
pricing in general provides a clear signal to 
stakeholders; a signal that is expressed in the 
very language of business that can therefore be 
immediately be considered by private sector 
decision makers.
If Article 6 can contribute to the diffusion of 
carbon pricing as well as a gradual increase in
the level of carbon pricing (see also OECD 
2018), the carbon pricing signal would neatly 
complement the more qualitative long-term vi­














Article 6 and the Global Stocktake 
4 Conclusions and 
Recommendations
This Policy Paper explored the relationship be­
tween the Global Stocktake (Art. 14) and Article 
6 by first highlighting relevant cross-references 
to various elements of the Paris Agreement and 
then analysing how Article 6 relates to the key 
functions of the Global Stocktake. The analysis
of the Paris Agreement text indicates that there 
are no direct links between both Articles but 
that they are indirectly connected through 
some of the elements which are key for the 
functioning of the Paris Agreement.
One such area is Parties’ NDCs: While Article 6 is 
to provide Parties with the possibility to coop­
erate in the implementation of their NDCs to 
allow for higher ambition, the Global Stocktake 
is to assess the progress of this implementation 
process and inform the next iteration of NDCs.  
The second area where the two elements are 
linked is the Transparency Framework. Here, 
the connection is even closer: In assessing pro­
gress, the Global Stocktake builds on the Trans­
parency Framework which in turn must take full 
account of the transfers taking place under Ar­
ticle 6 to correctly determine GHG emissions. 
These two intersections are directly relevant for 
some of the functions of the Global Stocktake,
with the accountability function standing out 
in this regard: In order to assess collective pro­
gress and indicate where the global community 
stands in the fight against climate change, the 
Global Stocktake must be able to build on ro­
bust accounting of Article 6 transfers. The Glob­
al Stocktake could combine information on 
how Article 6 mitigation outcomes have been 
generated, transferred and used with infor­
mation on Parties’ progress towards achieving 
their NDCs. This will not only allow to identify 
“low-ambition cooperation activities” that build
on hot air and inflated baselines but could fur­
ther provide an overall picture on the function­
ing of Article 6 as part of the Paris regime. Such 
a “comprehensive” Global Stocktake could also 
hold Article 6 accountable in terms of whether 
it has met its mandate and contributed to the 
purpose of the Paris Agreement by actually rais­
ing ambition.
The second function of the Global Stocktake 
which is of particular relevance for Article 6 is its 
ambition raising function. If the Global Stock­
take sets benchmarks for ambitious NDCs, these 
could be used under Article 6 for defining activ­
ities that are truly additional. Article 6, in return, 
could supply good practice examples and inno­
vative mitigation strategies identified through 
private actors in a market environment which 
could be showcased by the Global Stocktake.
Building on these findings, we suggest to estab­
lish a strong exchange process between the 
Global Stocktake and Article 6. This would not 
only be of utmost importance to allow for the 
Global Stocktake to properly perform its func­
tions (in particular its accountability function), 
but could also assist the development of Article 
6 activities. 
Furthermore, the Global Stocktake should in­
clude a periodic review of Article 6 and its 
governance framework. The Global Stocktake 
has a mandate to assess collective progress in a 
comprehensive manner. Under this mandate all
elements of the Paris Agreement, including Art.
6, should be scrutinized whether or not they 
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formulated in Art. 2. A periodic review of Article 
6 should therefore assess whether the ambition 
raising requirement formulated in Art. 6.1 is
met. With a robust accounting framework for 
Article 6, ideally, this review would even quanti­
fy the ambition raising effect of the activities 
conducted under Article 6. At the very bottom 
line, the review should make sure that the utili­
zation of Article 6 does not undermine overall
ambition.
The CDM Policy Dialogue 
The CDM Policy Dialogue was mandated by the CDM Execu­
tive Board to take stock of the Clean Development Mecha­
nism and develop recommendations on how to position the 
CDM in the evolving climate policy landscape and how to 
further streamline the process to ensure the effectiveness of 
the mechanism. 
A panel of 11 high-level individuals was formed to oversee a 
series of independent research activities. It also organized a 
stakeholder consultation programme holding a series of for­
mal and informal meetings across the globe. This research 
was subsequently collated and synthesised in a final report 
(CDM Policy Dialogue 2012) and presented to the CDM Exec­
utive Board in September 2012, nearly one year after the Dia­
logue had been launched at the margins of COP 17 in Dur­
ban, South Africa. 
Additional information: http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/
Such a review process could take the form of 
the CDM Policy Dialogue of 2012 (see Box), in
which independent research on past CDM ac­
tivities was conducted to elaborate reform pro­
posals for the mechanism (CDM Policy Dialogue 
2012). When assessing the performance of the 
Article 6 governance structure, the implemen­
tation of provisions and their impact on activi­
ties on the ground, the overarching objectives 
of Article 6 and the Paris Agreement should be 
used as guiding principles, asking whether co­
operative approaches have actually contributed 
to enhancing ambition, ensuring environmen­
tal integrity and promoting sustainable devel­
opment.
One way of doing this is to include a corre­
sponding mandate in the COP decisions gov­
erning Art. 6.2 and 6.4. The current draft nego­
tiating texts (September 2018) for Art. 6.2 and 
6.4 both contain placeholders to review the 
guidance for Art. 6.2 and modalities and proce­
dures for 6.4 at a later stage. This should be 
strengthened and amended to include not a 
one of review but a periodic review every five 
years to be aligned with the Global Stocktake.
If Parties decide not to include such a review 
process as part of the Global Stocktake, the 
evaluation could be conducted externally while
its results could still feed into the Global Stock­
take if submitted through the Subsidiary Bod­
ies’ reports (UNFCCC 2016b, para. 99). Using the 
Global Stocktake for such a review may provide 
the potential to enhance the performance of 
Article 6, ensuring that its functioning remains 
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